Abstract. In contrary to previous literature, we show in the Grossman-Stiglitz model of noisy rational expectation that the social value of asymmetric information can be improved with more informative prices when being informed is uncertain. Investors always benefit from a privately payoff-relevant information, but they have to pay more to increase the probability of observing the information. In equilibrium, this trade-off can lead to high-risk, high return investments.
Introduction
In exchange economics with costly information, it is well recognized that the more information prices convey, the worse off everybody can be. Therefore, public information has no social value; this is the so-called Hirschleifer effect.
1 Essentially, reducing the cost of private information makes more investors to be informed. This improves price efficiency on the one hand and leads to low-risk/low return investments on the other hand, which then reduce investor welfare. Is this always the case when information is more complex and uncertain? This paper introduces information uncertainty into a noisy rational expectation equilibrium model to answer this question. We find that, when investors pay to reduce the uncertainty to be informed, improving price efficiency can be socially valuable. Intuitively, the individual investor is always better off with the information. Facing the uncertainty to be informed, to benefit from acquiring information, investors pay more to increase the probability to be informed. This trade-off can lead to high-risk/high-return investments, improving investor welfare. This paper explores when such investors' welfare improvements are likely to arise.
The role of information on financial markets, in particular the effect of public information on price efficiency has been studied extensively. In summary, the literature shows that, the more (public) information is available to investors, the more informative the price is and the thinner is the space to make profits. This hurts investors' perception, thus diminishing exposures and risk sharing. More recently, the debate on social welfare of public information has involved mandatory financial disclosure, questioning the salvific role of disclosure itself (see Kurlat and Veldkamp (2015) , Gargano, Rossi and Wermers (2017) and Goldstein and Yang (2017) ). If, from one hand, information improves price efficiency, its consequences on social welfare are still debated. After the pioneering works by Allen (1984) and Laffont
1 The name follows after Hirshleifer (1978) where the role of information in the framework of technological uncertainty is discussed. Franklin Allen has been the first to acknowledge the implications of this effect for financial markets, especially in the context of exchange economies (see Allen (1984) ). (1985) , in a recent contribution, Angeletos and Pavan (2007) have posed again the question about the efficient use of information and the social value of information.
Security prices reflect available information about future payoffs, while uncertainty about the payoffs in different dimensions can affect security prices differently.
Uncertainty about multi-national or complex firms can be very different from the uncertainty of firms from particular industries. Even firms from the same industries can be exposed to multiple dimensions of uncertainty, such as cash flows, technological innovations, and firms idiosyncratic developments differently. Recent empirical evidence shows the revolution in information technology over the last 50 years has increased the price efficiency for the S&P 500 firms but indeed decreased for the average public firms (Bai, Philippon and Savov (2016) ). With increasing uncertainty on multi-dimensional information in financial markets, 2 it seems heroic to assume that investors are certain to be fully informed for a predetermined fixed cost. We, instead, assume that traders pay to increase their probability of being correctly informed. Put differently, we can think about an information market where investors can have access to different sources of information of different quality: the higher is the quality, the higher is the probability of being informed. However, there is a cost/disutility effect: investors pay more to increase the probability to be informed.
Such a trade-off between cost and benefit of uncertain information plays a central role in traders' decision making and can have important implications to market efficiency and social welfare.
With information uncertainty, this paper examines such trade-off in an otherwise standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model of noisy rational expectation equilibrium (NREE). The results partially confirm the Hirschleifer effect and its implications; making effort to be informed typically improves market efficiency but at the cost of reducing social welfare. However, in contrast with the majority of the aforementioned literature on the social role of information, we demonstrate that 2 The role of multi-dimensional and complex information markets has been widely discussed in recent literature. Among the others, Zhang (2006) discusses information uncertainty and its role in shaping prices; Veldkamp (2006) considers different information providers with different prices/quality. In Gorban, Obizhaeva and Wang (2018) authors assume the presence of high and low quality signals and uncertainty about the number of high quality informed agents.
when the information acquisition process is probabilistic and the cost of information is increasing and convex in the cost or effort to be informed, the trade-off can lead to high-risk, high return investments. Consequently the marginal expected utility gain from observing the information is not completely washed out by the cost of information acquisition, which leads to Pareto-optimal equilibrium and improves investors' welfare. Therefore there is possibility of detecting an increase of market quality associated with a beneficial increase in social welfare.
When information is imperfect and costly in a competitive economy, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that information efficiency of a price system depends on the proportion of individuals who are informed. The more individuals choose to be informed, the more efficient the price becomes, the less valuable the information is, and the less incentive individuals choose to be informed. Therefore in equilibrium, "the number of individuals who are informed is itself an endogenous variable" and the price becomes more informative when there are more informed traders. Concerning the welfare, informed trading always improves (marginal) welfare in the sense that an individual is always better-off for being informed rather uninformed, however in aggregate more informed trading always reduces the welfare for both informed and uninformed traders. In particular, the social welfare is always higher when traders are all uninformed than when they are all informed. Put differently, we detect a sort of Prisoner's dilemma situation.
3 The social welfare would be better off if nobody is informed. However, the single individual is rationally driven to being informed, at least with some positive probability. Therefore, in the equilibrium, the market may end up into a sub-optimal equilibrium (from the welfare viewpoint) typical of a coordination-failure situation.
Regarding the endogenous information production, we endogenize traders' decision on their optimal effort to become informed when facing information uncertainty. We model a continuum of agents playing an information game inspired by global games (Morris and Shin (2002) ). Differently from classical global games, the 3 In Kurlat and Veldkamp (2015) , a similar situation in which the economy would be better off if nobody is informed, is discussed but they focus on financial market anomalies in information disclosure. For a recent review about the implications of information disclosure in terms of market quality and welfare, we refer the reader to Goldstein and Yang (2017) .
strategy of the players is expressed in terms of the probability of being informed.
With this respect, our model resembles some recent literature on probabilistic choice models (Mattsson and Weibull (2002) ) and classical results in information theory (Hobson (1969) ). In Mattsson and Weibull (2002) , an individual optimally makes an effort to deviate from the status-quo (a reference probability) and change the likelihood of a finite set of possible scenarios in order to get closer to implementing a more desired outcome. Given that the reward is always higher for informed than uninformed, traders choose their optimal information acquisition strategy to maximize the trade-off between a higher expected reward of being more informed and a higher cost. When individuals set an optimal trade-off between the expected reward and the cost of deviating from the status-quo, Mattsson and Weibull (2002) show that the disutility of the optimal effort is related to the information entropy.
We rephrase this game-theoretic setting as a monetary reduction of wealth due to the investment in the information acquisition. Eventually, we model a two-stage optimization scheme based, firstly, on a strategic information game and, secondly, on a classical mean and variance investment decision problem. We characterize a unique Nash equilibrium in the vector of probabilities of traders being informed and a NREE in asset pricing. With the cost of information being increasing and convex, we show that traders' optimal effort depends on their risk aversion and the information structure. The resulting endogenous information equilibrium leads to outcomes that are significantly different from the Grossman-Stiglitz model.
In the Grossman-Stiglitz model, traders can decide to pay a fixed cost to becoming informed for sure. When information is complex and multi-dimensional, being informed becomes per se an uncertain process. The more they pay for the information, the more likely they will discover the right signal. As in the GrossmanStiglitz model, in equilibrium, the proportion of investors to be informed is determined endogenously and the price becomes more informative when there are more informed traders. However, different from the Grossman-Stiglitz model, the cost is not fixed, but contingent on market proportion of investors to be informed themselves. The optimal cost or effort for investors to becoming informed depends on investors' risk aversion and market information structure. Intuitively, more informed trading reduces dividend risk but increases information risk for uninformed traders, which dominates the dividend risk. This effect becomes more significant when price becomes less informative, the supply is less noisy, or traders are less risk averse, generating a hump-shaped risk premium relation to the informed trading. This hump-shaped risk premium in informed trading then provides high return, high risk investments, which improve investors' welfare. Therefore, differently from the previous studies about the market implications of the Hirschleifer effect in exchange economies, we show that there are situations in which market efficiency can be improved without harming social welfare.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first introduce the model and traders' optimization problem and then characterize the equilibrium in Section 2. In Section 3, we conduct a welfare analysis, together with risk premia and price efficiency.
Section 4 extends the analysis to explicitly model trading motives as a possible route to endogenous supply. Section 5 concludes and all the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
The Model
We consider the Grossman-Stiglitz model as our baseline model. 4 There is a continuum of homogenous traders, indexed by i ∈ (0, 1), who are price-takers and can invest in two assets; a risk-free asset with a gross rate of return R > 1 and a risky asset which pays a random dividendD at the end of the period. As in the Grossman-Stiglitzmodel, the dividend is given bỹ
Different from the Grossman-Stiglitz model in whichθ is fully observable at a fixed cost c, we assume thatθ can only be observed with a probability of p at an increasing and convex cost of c(p) in general. To have the most intuitive expressions, we present 4 In the last decades, several generalizations to a dynamic setting of the classical GrossmanStiglitzmodel have been proposed. Among the others, Wang (1993) , Veldkamp (2006) , Kyle, Obizhaeva and Wang (2017) . For the sake of simplicity, we prefer to stick with the standard static one-period model.
our main results for a quadratic cost function c(p
is the probability of becoming fully informed about the private informationθ and a trader observes it after paying the cost c(p). This implies that traders need to pay more in order to increase their probability to be informed. Note that if traders can only choose p = 0 or p = 1, we are back to the Grossman-Stiglitz model in which traders are either informed (with p = 1) or uninformed (with p = 0).
The risk-free asset is in zero net supply and the risky asset has a noisy net supply ofz ∼ N (0, v z ). Note that the supply shockz can be due to liquidity demand or noise trading. 6 The random variablesθ,˜ andz are independent of each other.
Traders are risk averse with a CARA utility function, i.e., u(W i ) = −e −αW i , where α is the absolute risk aversion andW i is trader i's terminal wealth. Let x i be the number of shares trader i holds andP be the price of the risky asset, then trader i's terminal wealth becomesW
where W i,0 is trader i's initial wealth. We assume traders' initial wealth is zero.
Therefore, their trading motive is purely speculative; they make profit by supplying liquidity to the noise/liquidity traders.
2.1. Information Uncertainty and Trading. There are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2.
At date t = 0, each trader-i chooses strategically p i and pays the cost µc(p i ), where µ is a scalar measuring the sensitivity to the cost. We refer to this stage as the information game. Next, at date t = 1, a Boolean random variableω i is drawn independently for each trader i with P(ω i = 1) = p i and P(ω i = 0) = 1 − p i . If ω i = 1, the trader observesθ and becomes informed (type I). Ifω i = 0, the trader does not observeθ and stays uninformed (type U ). Then, the value ofθ is realized and each trader, depending on his type, chooses his optimal demand x * i (P ) in the risky asset, where P is the price of the risky asset. Finally, at date t = 2, with the 5 We have also considered other cost functions that are increasing and convex in p. In general, we can also assume that p ∈ [p 0 , 1) and c(p 0 ) = 0, where p 0 ∈ [0, 1) is a reference or status quo probability of becoming informed. For simplicity, we assume p 0 = 0 in this paper.
6 In Section 4, we model the behaviour of liquidity/noise traders explicitly using endowment shocks. For now we simply take the noisy supply as given.
noise demandz, the market equilibrium priceP is determined by market clearing, each trader gets their allocation of shares according to their optimal demand and the equilibrium price. Then, the dividendD is paid and consumption occurs.
2.2. Information Acquisition and Trading Decisions. Concerning the trading decision, since dividend payoff is normally distributed (and the information cost c does not depend on the investment strategy), the standard solution for trader i's optimal holding of the risky asset is given by
where F i is the information set for trader i.
Regarding the information acquisition, by taking into account the associated cost, trader i's objective at date t = 0 is to choose his probability p i of being informed to maximize
where
is the market fraction of informed traders, which we will use as a state variable, and
are the expected utilities of the informed and uninformed, respectively. Note that V I (λ) and V U (λ) depend on λ since the equilibrium price P itself depends on λ.
Therefore, when needed, we will denote the price as P λ . 7 Also, we assume traders take λ as given, or more precisely, each trader conjectures the average choice of p i by all other traders before giving his best response in a non-cooperative strategic game. 8 Two technical lemmas are now stated; the first provides the solution to traders' optimal portfolio and information acquisition decisions given the market fraction λ. This result is based on a first order condition argument. The second 7 More precisely, in equilibrium, P λ = h λ (θ,z) is a random variable, where h λ is a deterministic function depending on λ.
8 Being λ a function of p = (p i ) i∈ [0, 1] , the problem of finding an optimal vector p * results in a non-cooperative strategic game.
lemma provides a concavity (second order) condition ensuring that the optimization problem is well-defined. For convenience, we denote by
the relative benefit of informed to uninformed. We also introduce the following
for any two normally distributed random variablesx andỹ. Following the NREE literature (Admati (1985) , Admati and Pfleiderer (1987) ), we postulate a linear pricẽ
where b θ and b z are two positive coefficients to be determined in equilibrium.
Lemma 2.1. Assume traders' expected utility is concave in
) < 0 and the equilibrium price P has the form of (2.6). Then (i) trader i's optimal demand in the risky asset is given by
where, conditional on his type k ∈ {I, U },
(ii) the expected utilities of trader i, conditional on his type k ∈ {I, U }, is given by
(iii) trader i's optimal choice of probability to be informed is given by
When trader's optimization problem is well-defined, (2.7) gives the optimal demand, (2.8) defines the value function to be informed and uninformed, while (2.9) provides the optimal probability choice.
Lemma 2.2. The function U(p i ; λ) as defined in (2.4) is concave in p i if and only
Some remarks are needed. First, note that, as soon as one of the concavity conditions in Lemma 2.2 is met, the optimal probability p * i in (2.9) is the same for all agents. In this sense, similarly to the Grossman-Stiglitz model, the cost c(p * i ) paid for acquiring the signal is the same for all agents, although endogenously computed.
Having said that, our traders' optimization problem differs significantly from that of the Grossman-Stiglitz model, which has the following solution,
where c is a fixed cost. Note that γ(λ) measures the relative benefit of informed to uninformed. Therefore, Grossman-Stiglitz model's information equilibrium requires
In other words, the expected utility of the informed after the cost exactly matches the expected utility of the uninformed. As a results, traders are indifferent between becoming informed or staying uninformed. In our model, due to the information uncertainty, the cost is associated with the average expected utility of being informed (with probability p i ) and uninformed (with probability 1 − p i ), characterized in (2.4).
As said, the optimization scheme of information acquisition and portfolio choice for trader i can be separated in two stages and solved backwards. At date 1, trader i decides his portfolio choice x * i given his type, i.e., the realization of ω i . This stage amounts to determining V I and V U . At date 0, agents play the information game:
by averaging on the likelihood of being informed and forming an expectation about other traders' actions, traders strategically set optimal strategies, p * = (p * i ) i∈(0,1) . Finally, to close the model, the equilibrium price P of the risky asset is determined by the market clearing condition as in the standard noisy rational expectation equilibrium.
2.3. Information and Asset Market Equilibria. Before characterizing the information and asset market equilibria, we first introduce the following definition.
Definition 2.1. We say that probability p * = (p * i ) i∈(0,1) , market fraction of informed λ * , and price P * of the risky asset are in equilibrium if
is a Nash equilibrium, meaning that for every i ∈ (0, 1),
(ii) the following consistency equation is satisfied 14) here ω * i is the random variable associated to the optimal probability p * i ; (iii) the price P * = P λ * satisfies market clearing condition
where x * (P ) = (x * i (P )) i∈(0,1) is the optimal investment strategy profile.
We now characterize the equilibrium in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. Assume (2.10) holds and denote by
the informativeness of the private signal, and the expected trading profit when no traders are informed and when all traders are informed, respectively. Then 9 At the equilibrium, expectations realize so that the fraction of informed, λ, exactly matches the value expected by the traders when using the revealed vector of probabilities p * .
(i) the equilibrium market fraction of informed traders, λ * , is determined by
(ii) the linear equilibrium price of the risky asset is given bỹ
where 18) and
As argued before, under the mild concavity conditions of Lemma 2.2, equilibrium
, all collapse to the same value p * solving (2.9); moreover, by virtue of (2.14), we have λ * = p * . 10 Note that, in the Grossman-Stiglitz model, although the asset market equilibrium is identical to ours, the information equilibrium differs significantly. Instead of (2.16), Grossman-Stiglitz model requires γ(λ) = 1 − e −ac , which means that the expected utility of the informed traders, after having paid the cost c, is exactly the same as that of the uninformed traders (who do not pay any cost). Differently in our model, every trader optimally chooses to pay a cost equal to µc(p * i ) = µc(λ * ) in equilibrium, and p * i = λ * becomes the (optimal) probability of observing the signalθ. As we will see in Section 4, this difference from the Grossman-Stiglitz model leads to very different welfare implications.
2.4. Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium. We now examine the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium with respect to parameter µ, which measures the cost sensitivity. Intuitively, λ → 0 in equilibrium as µ → ∞; λ = 1 when µ is small enough; otherwise λ ∈ (0, 1). This is demonstrated as following.
10 We stress the fact that, in principle, there could be multiple equilibira in λ for the fixed point argument (2.16) even if the optimization problem is well-defined in p * . In the following we provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness to keep this paper more focused on welfare analysis and market implications. We leave this intriguing discussion on multiple equilibira for future research.
Proposition 2.4. Assume (2.10) holds and c(p) = p 2 . Then
(ii) λ * = 1 when µ ≤μ := 1 2α
* ∈ (0, 1) when µ >μ; furthermore the Nash equilibrium is unique under condition (2.12).
Moreover, the equilibrium price P * , satisfying (2.17), is characterized by parameters b θ and b z defined in (2.18) and (2.19), evaluated at the equilibrium λ * .
Proposition 2.4 provides a necessary and sufficient condition (on the parameter µ) for thee existence of a non-trivial Nash equilibrium 0 < λ * < 1 and a sufficient condition (on the relative benefit γ) for the uniqueness. In general, the equilibrium fraction of informed traders is expected to increase as traders become less sensitive to the cost function. Put differently, we expect λ * to be decreasing in µ. However, it turns out that monotonicity is not guaranteed.
Proposition 2.5. The equilibrium λ = λ(µ) is decreasing in µ if and only if
In particular, at λ = 0, condition (2.22) is always satisfied; while at λ = 1, condition
(2.23) Proposition 2.5 provides conditions for the equilibrium λ = λ(µ) to be decreasing in µ or, put differently, it provides a less restrictive condition for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium λ * . Note that, since λ < 1 and γ (λ) < 0, condition (2.22) is always satisfied as soon as (2.12) is satisfied. This leads to the following theorem in which we summarize the main results of this section.
Theorem 2.6. Consider the optimization problem (2.4) with c(p) = p 2 . Suppose that µ <μ and γ(λ) < 1/3. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium (P * , λ * ) such that (i) λ * ∈ (0, 1), solves (2.16) and is decreasing in µ; and (ii) P * is given by (2.17).
Welfare Analysis
In this section, we analyze traders' welfare and examine market conditions in which traders' welfare increases when prices become more informative in equilibrium.
3.1. The Welfare in the Grossman-Stiglitz Model. To better understand the welfare effect of the information uncertainty, we first review the welfare results in the Grossman-Stiglitz model. The following lemma is helpful for our analysis.
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Lemma 3.1. The expected utilities of informed and uninformed traders are given by, respectively,
In the Grossman-Stiglitz model, with a fixed information cost of c, the social welfare of market participants is defined by U *
Based on Lemma 3.1, it is straightforward to show that
Note that ξ 0 = ξ 1 (1 + n) and hence U * GS (0) > U * GS (1). Therefore, in terms of welfare, traders are better off under the no-information equilibrium than under the full-information one (even if the cost of acquiring information is zero), which demonstrates the well-documented Prisoner's dilemma situation in welfare.
As a textbook example, consider the case where we just have two players. By fixing all the relevant parameters equal to one (v = v θ = v z = α = 1), we obtain V U (0.5) < V I (1) < V U (0) < V I (0.5), where λ = 0.5 accounts for the situation where the two players choose a different action. Eventually, the normal-form game has a payoff matrix as in Table 1 . The resulting Prisoner's dilemma illustrates a situation in which traders fail to coordinate towards the best outcome (represented by V U (0)) and come up with a socially less preferable Nash equilibrium. Table 1 . Two-player payoff matrix.
Furthermore, from Lemma 3.1, V I (λ) − V U (λ) > 0 for λ ∈ (0, 1); hence being informed is always beneficial. The expected utilities of both informed and uninformed traders are decreasing in λ, however the difference V I (λ) − V U (λ), can either increase or decrease in λ. In equilibrium, V I (λ)e αc = V U (λ), hence U * GS (λ) = V U (λ). Therefore, as the cost of acquiring information is reduced, more traders become informed, which improves price efficiency 12 but reduces welfare. Hence, we obtain the following remark:
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Remark 3.2. In the Grossman-Stiglitz model, only the no-information equilibrium, with λ = 0, is Pareto-optimal with respect to the social welfare. In fact, U *
3.2. The Welfare Improvement. To examine the welfare effect of information uncertainty in equilibrium, we fist have the following equilibrium condition,
12 It is well known that, in the Grossman-Stiglitz model as in our model, price informativeness measured by ρ 2 θ,P = 1/(1 + m), where m = ξ 1 /(nλ 2 ), is an increasing function of λ.
Note that a similar result also holds for some related recent contributions on information markets. See, for example, Kurlat and Veldkamp (2015) and Veldkamp (2006) .
From Lemma 3.1, we then have
where γ has been defined in (2.5) (and hence γ(λ) = 1 − f (λ) from Lemma 3.1).
Following (2.4), we now introduce traders' welfare in equilibrium.
Definition 3.1. In equilibrium, the overall welfare of the (speculative) traders is measured by
represents the cost function in equilibrium.
14 Based on Definition 3.1, it is straightforward to show that
Therefore as in the Grossman-Stiglitzmodel, in terms of welfare, traders are better off under the no-information than under the full-information equilibria even if the cost of acquiring information is zero.
To better understand this dilemma, note that as λ increases, price becomes more sensitive to the signal, i.e, b θ increases. When λ = 1, we obtain that d +θ − RP = αv z. Therefore, the informed traders are only compensated by the risk premium since the information they receive have been fully reflected by the equilibrium price,
i.e., b θ = 1. On the other hand, when λ = 0, which would be the outcome when information is extremely costly, the price is uninformative since b θ = 0. Therefore, traders are compensated by the risk premium, i.e, d − RP = α(v + v z )z, which is however larger than in the case of λ = 1, because traders perceive a larger dividend risk, thus a larger price discount is required.
As in the Grossman-Stiglitz model, prices become more efficient as traders become less sensitive to the cost (to reduce the information uncertainty). However, differently from the Grossman-Stiglitz model, we show that, in contrast to Remark 3.2, traders' welfare can be improved as the prices become more efficient. In particular, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the welfare to be increasing in the fraction of informed traders, i.e., (U * ) (λ) ≥ 0.
First, it follows from Lemma 3.1 thatV (λ) and hence U * (λ) can be written as (ii) traders' welfare is better than the welfare in the no-information equilibrium λ = 0 (where all traders make no effort to reduce the information uncertainty), i.e., U * (λ) ≥ V U (0), if and only if
(iii) traders' welfare is improving in the fraction of informed traders, i.e., (U * ) (λ) ≥
0, if and only if
In particular, at λ = 0, (U * ) (0) ≥ 0 if and only if
Proposition 3.3 (i) and (ii) show that traders' welfare are better off than that of the Grossman-Stiglitzmodel when the positive effect of information benefit dominates the cost effect for all λ ∈ [0, 1]; in particular, than the welfare in the no-information equilibrium λ = 0 when the dominance becomes stronger (note that V U (λ)/V U (0) ≥ 1). The reason being that they can strategically choose the probability p * i = λ to observeθ so that the welfare gain is not completely washed out by the cost of information.
More importantly, Proposition 3.3 (iii) shows that price efficiency can actually improve traders' welfare if the reduction in the expected utility of the uninformed traders due to an increase in λ is below a certain threshold, which depends on the welfare difference between the informed and uninformed, i.e., γ(λ), and its derivative. represent the information benefit effect. Condition (3.8) can be written as
, or equivalently,
meaning that, in equilibrium lambda, the marginal welfare cost due to an increment in the fraction of informed traders is less than the marginal welfare gain due to an increment in the probability of becoming informed. 16 In particular, the no-information equilibrium is not necessarily the best-case scenario (as in the Grossman-Stiglitz model). More specifically, if condition (3.9) is satisfied, there exist aλ > 0 such
The intuition is as follows. There are two opposing effects on the welfare when the fraction of informed traders increases and price becomes more informative. The first is the (negative) Hirshleifer effect: revealing private information reduces payoff uncertainty, which distorts risk-sharing between the informed and uninformed traders. Put differently, they jointly make less trading profit from the noise demandz. In the limiting case as v → 0, their trading profit approaches zero. The second (positive) effect comes from the increased probability to observe the private signalθ, thus being able to place demands x * i (P ) that are more positively correlated with the payoffD. Essentially, (3.8) shows the condition under which the second effect dominates the first, which results in a welfare improvement. At λ = 0, this dominance occurs when the squared Sharpe ratio ξ 0 = α 2 v z v D is relatively small, while the information advantage of the informed over the uninformed traders, γ(0), is relatively large.
The above intuition is illustrated by Panels (A) and (C) in Fig. 3 .1. Panel (C) plots the equilibrium welfare functions for four values of the informativeness of the private signal n. From which, we have the following two observations. First, the initial welfare improvement from the no-information equilibrium increases as the informativeness n increases, leading to a more hump-shaped welfare function and a more significant welfare improvement for lower equilibrium λ. Second, there is a strictly positive Pareto-optimal equilibrium λ * on the welfare improvement so that
In addition, the Pareto-optimal equilibrium λ * decreases in n, meaning that the Pareto-optimal equilibrium can only be achieved at a lower fraction of informed traders when the information become more informative. Panel (A) plots the regions Ω(λ) for the welfare improvement with the given equilibrium λ and (U * ) (λ) = 0 on the boundaries. It shows that the parameter Fig. 3 .2 demonstrate that the region for (U * )(λ) ≥ (U * ) (0) To better understand the underlying mechanism, we next try to relate traders' welfare improvement to the behaviour of risk premium as a function of the state variable.
3.3. Relationship between Welfare Improvement and Risk Premium. In this subsection, we try to draw a connection between the condition for the improvement of traders' welfare and the expected liquidity cost of the noise demand, the total risk faced by the uninformed traders can be larger than the unconditional variance of the dividend payoff, i.e.,
Intuitively, a larger proportion of informed traders reduces payoff uncertainty, however it also increases adverse selection risk for the uninformed traders so that they trade less aggressively knowing that price contains private information. Therefore, the aggregate risk can increase in λ if the adverse selection risk plays the most prominent role. The next corollary pins down the conditions for this to occur and also its connection with welfare improvement. (i) when ξ 0 > 1, it decreases in λ;
(ii) when ξ 0 ≤ 1, it increases in λ if and only if
(iii) when the aggregate riskv is decreasing in λ, traders' welfare U * (λ) is also decreasing at λ = 0, i.e., (U * ) (0) < 0.
Corollary 3.4 shows that, close to the no-information equilibrium λ = 0, more informed trading improves both risk premium and traders' welfare only if the expected trading profit ξ 0 ≤ 1. Intuitively, when the expected trading profit is large, the welfare of the uninformed traders decrease at a faster rate, as shown by Equation (3.9), although this can be offset by a relatively small n (signal informativeness), a small n also reduces γ(0) (welfare gain by observing the private signal). Therefore, an initial welfare improvement from the no-information equilibrium is always accompanied by an increase in risk premium and expected liquidity cost. Note that the converse is not true, i.e., an increase in risk premium is not a sufficient condition for welfare improvement at the no-information equilibrium. for the risk premium improvement for the given equilibrium λ withv (λ) = 0 on the boundaries. It shows that the parameter region for the risk premium improvement shrinks in λ. In addition, comparing Panels (A) and (B) in 3.1, for the given λ, the parameter region for the welfare improvement is always a subset of the parameter region for the risk premium improvement. This implies a positive connection from social welfare to the riks premium. This illustrates the risk premium channel to the welfare improvement, but not otherwise, as shown in Corollary 3.4. This mechanism channel becomes even more clearly in Figures 3.2, showing that, for given equilibrium λ, the parameter region forv > αv D is the largest, followed by the regions for (0), and (U * ) (λ) > 0 as subsequent subsets. Therefore, the improvement in social welfare comes from high return, high risk investments, which however not sufficient for better social welfare.
Modelling Trading Motives Explicitly
In this section, rather assuming noise in supply, we follow Bond and García (2017) explicitly to motivate trading using endowment shocks.
Each trader i receives an endowment, e iD , at the end of the trading period. Thus, trader i's terminal wealth is given by
We assume that e i is known to trader i, but not known to other traders. Moreover
4.1. Optimization problem. As before, each trader i's objective is to determine the optimal probability p * i of observing the private signal θ, in order to maximize his expected utility of terminal wealth,
are trader i's expected utility depending on whether or not he observes the private signal θ. Note that apart from θ, trader i also has a another private signal, which is his own endowment shock e i . Intuitively, e i helps trader i to forecast the aggregate endowment shockz, which is negatively correlated with the equilibrium priceP . For example, after observing the same price, a trader who receives a positive endowment shock will infer a larger value for θ than a trader who receives a negative endowment shock.
Conditional on his information set, trader i's optimal portfolio is given by
where the information set F i = {θ, P, e i } if trader i is informed and F i = {P, e i } if he is uninformed. As before, we conjecture a linear equilibrium price,
Next, we characterize the solution to traders' optimization problem. The optimal demand for the uninformed and informed traders are given by
, and
and
respectively.
Next, we compute expected utilities for the informed and uninformed traders, i.e., V I (λ, e i ) and V U (λ, e i ). Next, we work out . First, trader i's welfare given his information set is given by
where χ i ≡ E D −P |F i and v i ≡ Var D −P |F i . Since, conditional on the investor i's endowment shock e i , the price P and expected excess return χ i follow a bivariate normal distribution, we can obtain the following expression for trader i's welfare given his own endowment shock.
Proposition 4.1.
From Proposition 4.1, the expected utility gain of becoming informed is independent of his endowment shock e i , i.e.,
Therefore, the solution to trader i's optimization problem in (4.2) is given by (2.9) just as in the baseline model. Also, the concavity condition, U (p i ; λ, e i ) < 0, is satisfied if (2.12) is true, where γ(λ) is given by (4.9).
4.2. Equilibrium. Since we assume the risky asset is in zero net supply, market clearing requires
where λ is the fraction of informed traders. In the next proposition, we determine the coefficient b θ and b z in equilibrium.
, there exists a linear equilibrium price of the risky asset,
12) 13) and λ is the solution of
14)
where γ(λ) is given by (4.9), assuming the sufficient condition for concavity in (2.12)
is satisfied for the equilibrium λ.
4.3.
Welfare. The welfare of trader i, given his endowment shock, e i can be measured by 15) since every trader optimally choose the same probability p * i = λ in the Nash equilibrium.
Next, we consider two special cases where λ = 0 and λ = 1. Note that for λ = 0, the equilibrium price becomesP = d − α(v θ + v )z and trader i's optimal portfolio is
− e i . On the other hand, when λ = 1, the equilibrium price and trader i's optimal portfolio are given byP = d+θ−αv z and x * i (θ, P, e i ) = d+θ−P αv
The following proposition characterizes traders' overall welfare.
Corollary 4.3. The welfare of trader i is characterized by Equation (4.8), where
when λ = 0 with µ → ∞, and . Moreover, traders are always better off in the no-information equilibrium than in the full-information equilibrium, i.e.,
(4.18) Corollary 4.3 shows that, in terms of welfare, the no-information equilibrium (no traders observeθ) dominates the full-information equilibrium (all traders observeθ), since welfare improves for every trader when λ switches from zero to one, regardless of the realization of endowment shocks. In other words, the full-information equilibrium is not Pareto efficient, in the sense that there exists an equilibrium with a different λ such that no traders are worse off and at least one trader's welfare improves. Therefore, an important question is whether the no-information equilibrium also dominates any other equilibrium with λ ∈ (0, 1). If so, one may conclude that (at least in this particular model setting), the social value of asymmetric information is strictly negative, and traders can be made better off if no one observesθ, e.g. by increasing the cost parameter µ. However, in the following we show (numerically) that this is not the case. In Figure 4 .1, it is clear that the welfare improvement region shrinks in v u and e. Also the λ * for which U (λ * ; e) = 0 increases with v u but decreases with e.
Therefore, there exists λ close to zero such that the welfare improves for traders with small endowment shocks, i.e., e relatively close to zero. Therefore, equilibria with asymmetric information can be Pareto efficient, since it is not dominated by the no-information equilibrium.
Conclusion
In this paper, we model traders' strategic choice of the probability to observe a costly private signal that helps to reduce uncertainty of the future payoff in an otherwise standard noisy rational expectation model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) .
We find that, in contrary to prior literature, paying a cost to increase the probability of becoming informed can be beneficial to speculative traders who are supplying liquidity to either noise traders (with exogenously given liquidity needs) or hedgers who trade to insure against future endowment risk. Due to high-risk, high return investments, the marginal expected utility gain from observing the information is not completely washed out by the cost of information acquisition. Therefore, with information uncertainty, the social value of asymmetric information is not strictly negative as suggested by previous literature. Consequently, an increase of market quality can be associated with a beneficial increase in social welfare.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Since traders' terminal wealthW i = x i (D −P ) is normally distributed, given his type, trader i's optimal demand is given by
For the informed trader who observes θ and P ,
On the other hand, for the uninformed trader who only observes P ,
Next, we compute trader i's expected utility given their information set F i , which yields
For the informed,
. Next, since the conditional expectation χ i = E D − RP |F i itself is a normally distributed random variable for both informed and uninformed traders, we can use following standard result to compute trader i's unconditional expected utility.
Lemma A.1. Let X ∈ R n be a normally distributed random vector with mean µ and variance-covariance matrix Σ. Let b ∈ R n be a given vector, and A ∈ R n×n a symmetric matrix. If I − 2ΣA is positive definite, then E exp{b X + X AX} is well defined, and
given by
Applying Lemma A.1 to the conditional expected utility in (A.4) with
, µ = 0 leads to the desired result and the expressions for ξ I (λ) and ξ U (λ) in (2.8).
Thus, assuming the concavity condition U (p i , λ) is satisfied, trader i's optimal choice of p i is determined by the first order condition,
, which leads to (2.9).
Note that in equilibrium,
.
Also, note that
Therefore in equilibrium, (A.7) becomes
We have from (A.8) that
which leads to condition (2.10).
Moreover, for a sufficient condition, note that (A.7) can be written as
which can be written as
Therefore, a sufficient condition for U (p; λ) ≤ 0 is given by A.12) which is equivalent to 1 + 1 2 .13) that simplifies to the condition (2.12).
Next, if the sufficient condition for U (p; λ) ≤ 0 is satisfied, the Nash equilibrium for the choice of probability p i to observe the private signal θ must be symmetric, since traders are homogeneous, i.e., p * i = λ for all i ∈ (0, 1), from which we obtain the equilibrium λ in (2.16).
Proof of Proposition 2.4: Note that γ(λ) ∈ (0, 1). With c(p) = p 2 , from the equilibrium condition 2αµλ = γ(λ)/[1 − γ(λ)], it is easy to see that λ → 0 as µ → ∞. For λ = 1, we have µ = It remains to discuss the case µ >μ. To this aim, note that, in case of c(p) = p 2 , the fixed point (2.16) is equivalent to
By defining
(A.14) can be rewritten as
Assuming µ ≥ 2γ 2 (λ)/α (otherwise the fixed point has no solution and λ * = 1), F 1 and F 2 are well-defined. It is not difficult to show that 0 < F 1 (λ) ≤ F 2 (λ). Therefore, since F 1 (0) > 0, one solution to (A.14) exists if and only if F 1 (1) < 1. This condition is exactly µ >μ.
Finally, concerning uniqueness, note that dF 1 (λ)/dλ < 0. Indeed,
Negativity is due to the fact that γ (λ) < 0, γ(λ) > 0, and F 1 (λ) > 0. By monotonicity, λ = F 1 (λ) provides at most one solution. Therefore, if a second solutionλ to the fixed point exists, it must solveλ = F 2 (λ). By definition F 2 (λ) > 1 2γ(λ) ; therefore, as soon as γ(λ * ) < 1/3, we would haveλ = F 2 (λ) > 3/2, which is unfeasible. This proves that the solution to the fixed point is unique as soon as the sufficient condition for concavity, γ(λ) < 1/3, is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2.5: In equilibrium,
For λ = λ(µ), taking the derivative w.r.t. µ, we have Since γ(λ) = 1 − f (λ), this is equivalent to
Using the fact that f (λ) = ξ 1 +nλ 2 ξ 0 +nλ 2 , we obtain condition (2.23).
Proof of Proposition 3.3: In equilibrium, the welfare function is given by γ (λ) (1 − λγ(λ)) 2 .
Therefore U (λ) ≥ 0 if and only if
Since c(p) = p 2 , it follows that
which leads to (3.8). At λ = 0, V U (0) V U (0) = nξ 0 1 + ξ 0 .
Applying this to condition (3.8) at λ = 0 leads to condition (3.9). If the trader is informed (K = I), i.e., F = {θ, P, e}, since χ = d + θ − P and v = v , we obtain that µ χ|e = −β e,P e, µ P |e = d + β e,P e, v χ|e = v θ + v P |e − 2σ θ,P , σ (χ,P )|e = σ θ,P − v P |e . On the other hand, if the trader is uninformed (K = U ), i.e., F = {P, e}, since χ =
(1 − κ)(d − P ) − κβ e,P e and v = v D − κσ θ,P , κ = σ θ,P /v P |e , we obtain that µ χ|e = −β e,P e, µ P |e = d + β e,P e, v χ|e = (1 − κ) 2 v P |e , σ (χ,P )|e = −(1 − κ)v P |e . Proof of Proposition 4.2: Substituting the optimal demands x * (P, e) and x * (θ, P, e) in (4.5) and (4.6) into the market clearing condition (4.10) leads the following, (d − P ) αv + λ αv θ = 1 + (1 − λ) κβ e,P αv U z (A.24)
Thus, the equilibrium price can be written as Since v U = v D − κσ θ,P , κ = σ θ,P /v P |e and β e,P = σ e,P /v e , also we can obtain that
Substituting (A.29) back into (A.27) leads to (4.12).
Next, given x, we substitute (A.28) into the expression for b θ and obtain that
. 
